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U.S. Supreme
Court Reports III. Most of the evidence in this case consisted of testimony of the acts and declarations of the defendants. The petitioners contend that because some of these acts and declarations took place after the conspiracy ended, they were erroneously admitted without being properly limited to the defendant who did the act or made the statement
Page 616 testified to. We
must, therefore, decide when the conspiracy ended. The petitioners
contend it ended when the last of the parties, Leopold Knoll, was
admitted to the United States on December 5, 1947. Then and there,
they say, the fraud if any was complete, and the conspiracy to
violate the statutes was complete. The Government contends that a
part of the conspiracy was an agreement among the conspirators to
conceal their fraud by any means, and so it was alleged in the
indictment. But there is no
statement in the indictment of a single overt act of concealment
that was committed after December 5, 1947, and no substantial
evidence of any. Such acts as were set forth and proved were acts
that revealed and did not conceal the fraud. Therefore, there is no
evidence in the record to establish as a part of the conspiracy that
the conspirators agreed to conceal the conspiracy by doing what was
necessary and expedient to prevent its disclosure. There was a
statement of Munio Knoll in the record to one witness Haberman that
indicated Munio's purpose to cover up and conceal the conspiracy.
This is not evidence that the conspiracy included the further
agreement to conceal. It is in the nature of an afterthought by the
conspirator for the purpose of covering up. The trial court so
understood it, and this statement of Munio Knoll, as testified to by
Haberman, was This Court in
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, rejected the Government's
contention that in every conspiracy there is implicit an agreement
as a part thereof for the conspirators to collaborate to conceal the
conspiracy.
Page 617
Date Printed: September 14, 1999
U.S. Supreme Court Reports
While the
concealment was alleged in this indictment as a part of the
conspiracy, it was not proved. We think on this record that the
conspiracy ended December 5, 1947. It does not
necessarily follow that acts and declarations made after the
conspiracy ended are not admissible. In this case, the essential
fact of the conspiracy was the existence of phony marriage
ceremonies entered into for the sole purpose of deceiving the
immigration authorities and perpetrating a fraud upon the United
States. Acts which took place after the conspiracy ended which were
relevant to show the spuriousness of the marriages and the intent of
the parties in going through the marriage ceremonies were competent
- such as the fact that the parties continued to live apart after
they came to the United States; that money was paid the so-called
marriages; and that suits were started to terminate whatever legal
relationship there might have been upon the record. Declarations stand on a different footing. Declarations of one conspirator may be used against the other conspirator not present on the theory that the declarant is the agent of the other, and the admissions of one are admissible against both under a standard exception to the hearsay rule applicable to the statements of a party. Clune v. United States, 159 U.S. 590, 593. See United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 460, 468-470. But such declaration can be used against the co-conspirator only when made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 217; Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 308-309. There can be no furtherance of
Page 618 a conspiracy that
has ended. Therefore, the declarations of a conspirator do not bind
the co-conspirator if made after the conspiracy has ended. That is
the teaching of Krulewitch v. United States, supra, and Fiswick v.
United States, supra. Those cases dealt only with declarations of
one conspirator after the conspiracy had ended. They had no
application to acts of a conspirator or others which were relevant
to prove the conspiracy. True, there is dictum in Logan v. United
States, supra, at 309, frequently repeated, which would limit the
admissibility of both acts and declarations to the person performing
them. This statement of the rule overlooks the fact that the
objection to the declarations is that they are hearsay. This reason
is not applicable to acts which are not intended to be a means of
expression. The acts, being relevant to prove the conspiracy, were
admissible, even though they might have occurred after the
conspiracy Date Printed: September 14, 1999
U.S. Supreme Court Reports
Relevant
declarations or admissions of a conspirator made in the absence of
the co-conspirator, and not in furtherance of the conspiracy, may be
admissible in a trial for conspiracy as against the declarant to
prove the declarant's participation therein. The court must be
careful at the time of the admission and by its instructions to make
it clear that the evidence is limited as against the declarant only.
Therefore, when the trial court admits against all of the
conspirators a relevant declaration of one of the conspirators after
the conspiracy has ended, without limiting it to the declarant, it
violates the rule laid down in Krulewitch. Such declaration is
inadmissible as to all but the declarant. In the trial of a criminal case for conspiracy, it is inevitable that there shall be, as there was in this case, evidence as to declarations that is admissible as against
Page 619 all of the alleged
conspirators; there are also other declarations admissible only as
to the declarant and those present who by their silence or other
conduct assent to the truth of the declaration. These declarations
must be carefully and clearly limited by the court at the time of
their admission and the jury instructed as to such declarations and
the limitations put upon them. Even then, in most instances of a
conspiracy trial of several persons together, the application of the
rule places a heavy burden upon the jurors to keep in mind the
admission of certain declarations and to whom they have In our search of
this record, we have found only one instance where a declaration
made after the conspiracy had ended was admitted against all of the
alleged conspirators, even though not present when the declaration
was made.[fn3] Was the admission of this one item of hearsay
evidence sufficient to reverse this case? We think not. In
view of the fact that this record fairly shrieks the quilt of the
parties, we cannot conceive how this one admission could have
possibly influenced Date Printed: September 14, 1999
U.S. Supreme Court Reports
Page 620 is a proper case
for the application of Rule 52 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.[fn4] We hold that the error was harmless. Finding no
reversible error in this record, the judgment is Affirmed. Date Printed: September 14, 1999
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